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Gender inequality in labor market outcomes persists in all industrialized countries. Despite im-
portant advances, the process of gender convergence seems to have reached a plateau since the
early 2000s. The unequal distribution of the family burden and the persistence of gender norms
that reinforce the role of women as main caregivers are a promising candidate to account for the
remaining gender gaps in the labor market (Kleven et al., 2019a,b).
In this paper we propose a complementary explanation to account for the persistence of gender
inequality, namely, the asymmetric effect of commuting costs on the labor supply of men and
women. High commuting costs will never induce an individual to join the labor force but it may
discourage participation. For example, in a two-member household, the presence of long commutes
may foster specialization by family members in either market or home production to avoid paying
the cost of going to work twice (Black et al., 2014). We argue that the gendered distribution of
household tasks and the prevalence of social norms that make more costly for men to stay home
may have contributed to the stagnation of female labor participation in a context of increasing
travel times.
In the US, the cost of going to and from work has increased significantly. In 1980, the average
two-way commuting of a full-time worker was 45 minutes. By 2016, it had increased to 54 minutes
(i.e. a 26% higher). Also in 2016, about 20% of commuters spent more than 90 minutes a day
traveling to and from work.1 In Europe, commuting costs are comparable in size and have also
increased over time (Gimenez-Nadal and Molina, 2014). Commuting is a very undesirable activity
for workers (Kahneman et al., 2004; Clark et al., 2019), detrimental to mental and physical health
(Roberts et al., 2011; Sandow et al., 2014), and responsible for work absenteeism (Van Ommeren
and Gutiérrez-i Puigarnau, 2011).
In this paper, we estimate the labor supply elasticity of commuting time using microdata from
the US Census and investigate its contribution to the persistence of gender inequality. To guide
our empirical analysis, we rely on a parameterized version of the model in Black et al. (2014). In
the model, household members specialize in home or market production in the presence of costly
commuting. The model also predicts who withdraws from the market on the basis of differences
in labor and home productivity, and the presence of social norms about the role of men and
women in society. Consistently with the theoretical predictions, we uncover an important degree
of heterogeneity in our results. First, we find a large effect of commuting costs on the labor supply
of married women, while the effect is small and generally non-significant for men. We also show
that the response for women monotonically increases with the number of children, suggesting that
family responsibilities are important in explaining within-household specialization in the presence
of long commutes. In contrast, we do not find significant differences in the response across skill
1Commuting times are recorded in the US Census since 1980.
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groups, indicating that differences in labor market productivity are not responsible for the gender
asymmetry in the results. Finally, we focus on a sample of immigrant women in the US. We report
larger estimates of the commuting time elasticity among those originating from countries with
more traditional gender views. This evidence is consistent with the prevalence of social norms that
reinforce the male breadwinner model and contribute to the persistence of gender inequality in a
context of increasing commuting costs.
In our empirical analysis, we exploit the variation in commuting times across MSA (Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas) in the US using the IPUMS data. To identify the causal effect of commuting
on the individual labor supply, we follow Harari (2016) and use the shape of cities as an exogenous
source of variation. We focus on city compactness measured by how close the shape of the city
is to a circle. Compactness is determined by the presence of geographical accidents such as steep
mountains and water bodies. It has been shown that more compact cities enjoy shorter commuting
times and we exploit this regularity to identify the effect of travel times on labor supply decisions
(Angel et al., 2010). The main threat to our identification strategy is that a city feature corre-
lated with its shape might have a direct effect on individuals’ labor supply. To take into account
this concern, we first normalize our measure of city compactness so that it is uncorrelated to size
and density. We also follow the suggestions in Altonji et al. (2005) to validate our identification
strategy. First, we show that city shape is uncorrelated with the observable characteristics of indi-
viduals that have recently moved to a city. Second, we verify that our IV estimates are unaffected
by the inclusion of individual and MSA controls. Finally, we show that our estimates conform to
expectations when the model is estimated on subgroups of the population that should be affected
differently by commuting times (e.g. single women vs married women without children).
A few recent studies have already identified a role for commuting costs in explaining the re-
maining gender differences in labor market outcomes. Using evidence for the UK, Petrongolo and
Ronchi (2020) show that men have higher wage returns from voluntary job changes, while women
have higher returns in terms of vicinity to workplaces. This is consistent with the view that women
attribute a higher value to short commutes than men. For France, Le Barbanchon et al. (2019),
using a job search model where commuting matters, estimate that gender differences in the will-
ingness to commute explain about a 10% of the gender gap in re-employment wages. For Sweden,
Bütikofer et al. (2019) show that women benefit less from transport infrastructures that give access
to distant labor markets, negatively affecting the gender wage gap. Moreno-Maldonado (2019)
using a quantitative spatial model of households shows that the labor force participation of women
with children is lower in big cities due to longer commutes. The paper that is closest to ours is
Black et al. (2014) as it documents that US cities with longer commutes have lower participation
rates among married women.
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. We first provide a causal estimate of the
effect of commuting time on individuals’ labor supply based on an innovative source of exogenous
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variation that relies on geographical accidents that shape cities. Our IV estimates indicates that
the effect of commuting is larger than the suggested by OLS. Second, we show that the effect
on women increases with the family burden and is stronger among immigrant women originating
from countries with more gendered social norms. In contrast, we do not find evidence that wage
differentials can explain the gender asymmetry in the response to commuting costs. We conclude
that the unequal distribution of family responsibilities and the presence of social norms about the
role of men and women in society explain why gender neutral commuting costs affect men and
women differently and contribute to the persistence of the gender inequality in the labor market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework
for the labor force participation decision of household members and guides the empirical analysis.
Section 3 describes the data, samples and main variables in the analysis. Section 4 lays out the main
empirical specification and the instrumental variables strategy that we use. Results are presented
and discussed in Section 5 and some concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.
2 Theoretical framework
To study the relationship between commuting costs and the labor supply of household members,
we parametrize the model in Black et al. (2014). The main model prediction is that in the presence
of high commuting costs it is optimal that one household member withdraws from the labor force.
The decision of which member exits depends on: i) differences in productivity in the market and at
home and ii) the presences of gendered social norms about the role of men and women in society.
We present the model and discuss the main results below and defer to Appendix A the model
solution.
A household consists of two spouses (j = m for men or f for women). The utility of each
spouse is given by uj(cj , lj) = αj ln cj + (1−αj) ln lj , where cj denotes consumption and lj denotes
time spent at home, which we interpret as domestic work. The parameter αj reflects the individual
preference for consumption over time spent at home. The inequality αm > αf is consistent with
women being more productive in domestic work or with the presence of a social norm that makes
domestic work more acceptable for women. Individuals face a time constraint (1 = hj + lj + k),
where hj denotes time spent in market work and k is a fixed commuting cost that can only be
avoided by not participating in the labor market. There might be intra-household transfers y,
implying that the budget constraints for men and women are cm = wmhm − y and cf = wfhf + y.
We assume that households maximize the sum of the individual utilities um + uf .
Since commuting costs are unaffected by the number of hours worked, it is necessary to solve
the model in two steps. First, we obtain the optimal amount of consumption, time at home and
the transfer made when both spouses work (hm > 0 and hf > 0) and when only one does (hm > 0
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and hf = 0, or viceversa). Second, we compare the utility levels in each situation to determine if
there is specialization (one spouse stays at home) and, when necessary, which spouse will exit the
labor market.
The top panel of Figure 1 plots household utility, um(cm, lm) + uf (cf , lf ) as a function of
commuting costs when both spouses are identical in terms of wages and preferences. The solid line
represents the level of utility when both spouses work while the dotted line represents the utility
when only one does. Utility is decreasing with commuting costs in both cases, but the slope is more
negative when the two household members work as commuting costs are paid twice. Hence, for
some parameter configurations, an increase in commuting costs (k) might induce some households
to specialize.
To determine who stays at home when commuting costs are high, we first focus on the role of
different productivities in the labor market (e.g. the presence of a gender gap in wages) under the
assumption of symmetric preferences (αm = αf ). An illustration of this case is provided in the
second panel of Figure 1. Since both spouses are equal in terms of preferences, it yields higher
consumption levels and utility if the spouse with the higher wage works.
Let us now analyze the case where wages are equal but spouses preferences are different or there
are gendered social norms. For example, an αm > αf may reflect a situation where women are more
productive in domestic work or the presence of a social norm that supports the male breadwinner
model. One example is depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 1. Here, women value time at home
relatively more and, as a result, um + uf is higher when they stay home.
From this stylized model we can derive several predictions that will be empirically tested. First,
the presence of high commuting costs favor within-household specialization in either market or home
production. Second, the model predicts that the presence of a gender wage gap will induce women
to specialize in home production. Finally, traditional gender norms will lead women to withdraw
from the market when commuting costs increase.
3 Data, sample and variables
In the empirical analysis we employ data from the decennial US censuses and the American Com-
munity Surveys (King et al., 2010). The baseline analysis is conducted on the 5% census sample
of 2000, which is the last census to record commuting times. To investigate the robustness of our
results, we also employ the 5% census metro sample in 1980 and 1990 and the 1% annual samples in
the American Community Surveys for the 2007-2011 period. We restrict the analysis to prime-age
individuals (25-55 years old), with special emphasis on married couples as the model predictions
are specific to two-member households. We only consider individuals living in cities. We use the
definition of city in the 2000 Census (i.e. Metropolitan Statistical Areas, MSA). There are 272
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MSAs that comprise about 80% of the US population.2
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables in the study. Panel A focus
on measures at the city-level. The first row shows the summary statistics for commuting times.
We follow Black et al. (2014) and compute the city-average two-way commute time using the
information reported in the Census that asks directly about door-to-door travel time in minutes.3
As Black et al. (2014) we restrict the sample to white male workers to measure commuting as this
group has the highest employment rate. In 2000, the average commuting time is about 51 minutes,
with a standard deviation of 8, a maximum of 84 and a minimum of 34 minutes. Table 1 also
shows summary statistics for population size, city income, share of employment in manufacturing,
share of public employment, share of people below the poverty threshold, share of college educated
and the gender wage gap. These variables are computed from the US county and City Data Book
(CCDB) in 2000 and employed as controls in the empirical analysis.
Panel B displays the summary statistics for the controls at the individual level obtained from
the IPUMS in 2000, separately for men and women. The first raw displays the descriptives for
labor force participation, followed by other indicators of the intensive margin of the labor supply:
number of weekly hours worked, part-time employment, an indicator for working long hours (more
than 50 hours per week) and the probability of working in an occupation with a high concentration
of part-time employment (i.e. an occupation at the top 10th or 25th percentile of the distribution
of part-time employment across all occupations). According to the descriptives in the table, the
gender gap in participation in 2000 was almost 10 percentage points (80% for men and 70% for
women). Part-time employment was also much more prevalent among women than men (17%
versus 2%). Men also worked on average more hours than women (46.3 versus 39.55) and had a
higher probability of working long hours (36% versus 14%). The rest of the rows in the panel shows
the descriptive statistics for the individual controls included in estimation: age, spousal income,
presence of children, having a college degree and race.
Finally, we employ the World Value Survey (WVS) to measure the gender role attitudes in the
country of origin of US immigrants. To increase the number of countries in the sample, we pool the
different surveys in the WVS conducted between 2000 and 2011. Following Alesina et al. (2013)
we focus on two statements about the role of men and women in society: “When jobs are scarce,
men should have more right to a job than women” and “Men make better political leaders than
women do”. We compute the percentage of individuals in each country who agree or strongly agree
with the statements. Figure 2 indicates a clear positive correlation in the responses to the two
statements. It also shows a substantial degree of heterogeneity across countries. Accordingly, the
2The average MSA population was around 755 thousand inhabitants in 2000. The smallest MSA is
Kokomo (IN) with about 102 inhabitants, the median city is Montgomery (AL) with 333 thousand and the
largest MSA is Los Angeles with more than 9.5 millions.
3Notice that this definition includes all modes of transportation.
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share of agreement with the statement “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a
job than women” varies from 4% in Canada to almost 96% in Egypt. When asked about whether
“Men make better political leaders than women do”, the share varies from less than 10% in Sweden
to about 88% in Egypt. The large variation in gender role attitudes across countries should allow
us to explore the interaction between culture and commuting costs among US immigrants.
4 Empirical strategy
To study the effect of commuting costs on the labor supply decisions of men and women we estimate
the following model:




cγ + εic (1)
where LaborForceic is an indicator variable that takes value one if individual i living in MSA
c participates in the labor market and zero otherwise. The explanatory variable commutingc is
the average two-way commuting time for working white men in city c. To ease interpretation we
divide commuting time by 100. Accordingly, β is the percentage point increase in the probability
of participating in the labor market resulting from a one minute increase in travel time.
Xi includes a comprehensive set of individual characteristics: spousal income (in logs), an
indicator for the presence of children, age, race and educational attainment dummies.4 Xc are
control variables at the MSA level such as the % of employment in the manufacturing sector, the
% of public employment, median household income (in logs), the gender wage gap, population -and
its square- (in logs) and regional dummies. The descriptive statistics for the control variables are
displayed in Panels A and B of Table 1.
Despite this rich set of control variables, the OLS estimates in equation 1 might be biased for,
at least, two reasons. First, cities experiencing positive economic shocks might have higher rates of
labor force participation which directly impact on congestion and travel times. This may generate
a reversed causality bias pushing the OLS estimates towards zero. Second, sorting of individuals
across cities also represents a threat to the OLS estimates. Costa and Kahn (2000) show that high-
power couples tend to sort into large cities to better deal with the co-location work problem. To
the extent that commuting times are longer in larger cities, the OLS estimates will also be biased
towards zero in the presence of sorting.
In order to address the endogeneity concerns, we adopt an instrumental variable strategy that
exploits the shape of cities as an exogenous source of variation for travel times. City shape is
determined by geographical constraints such as water-bodies or steep slopes (Saiz, 2010; Harari,
4Educational attainment dummies corresponds to the 12 categories of completed education defined in the
Census.
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2016). At the same time, the shape of cities is an important determinant of intra-urban commuting
costs. A city with a more compact geometry (i.e. a shape closer to that of a circle) will be
characterized by shorter within-city trips and more cost-effective transport networks (Bertaud,
2004; Cervero, 2001). We employ measures of city compactness proposed by Angel et al. (2010) and
also employed in Harari (2016) as an instrument for commuting time. We use the US 2000 Urban
Area GIS Files from the National Historical Geographic Information System Database (NHGIS)
(Steven Manson and Ruggles, 2018) to compute the city shape variables. We overlay a 100x100





N , where di,CBD is the distance between the centroid of each grid
cell, i, and the Central Business District (CBD).5 Accordingly, the proximity index measures








N(N−1) , ∀i 6= j, where di,j is the distance between grid cell centroids, i
and j. The cohesion index is the average distance between all pairs of points in the city.7 Note
that this measure implicitly assumes that jobs and residents are homogeneously distributed
throughout the city.
These two indices are correlated with city surface as bigger cities will present longer distances
between the interior points. To isolate the effect of city shape, we normalize the two measures
following the procedure described in Angel et al. (2010). In a first step, we compute the Equivalent
Area Circle (EAC) of city c. That is, a circle whose area coincides with that of the city. The
rationale for building a circle is that it is the most compact geographical shape (i.e. the distances
between the interior points are minimized). In a second step, we compute the proximity and
cohesion indices that the EAC of each city would exhibit.8 Finally, we compute the normalized







We employ the normalized version of the proximity and cohesion index in our empirical analysis.
Notice that by construction the normalized proximity and cohesion indices are uncorrelated with
5We use the Central Business District Geocodes dataset from Holian and Kahn (2015).
6A few MSAs have more than one principal city. In these cases, we compute the popultion weighted
average proximity index.
7In MSAs with more than one principal city, we compute the popultion weighted average cohesion index.
8Specifically, proximityEAC,c = (2/3) × rEAC,c while cohesionEACc = 0.9054 × rEAC,c, where rEAC,c is
the radius of the Equivalent Area Circle.
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the size and the density of the city. A value of the normalized index close to 1 means that the city
index is close to the optimal EAC index (i.e. circular city). Lower values, instead, indicate that
the shape of the city is less circular. Figure 3 illustrates the actual shape and the EAC of Chicago
(Panel A) and Minneapolis (Panel B). Chicago, a city with long commuting times (i.e. average
two-way commute in 2000 was 68 minutes), has a non-circular shape as the lake causes a mismatch
between the EAC and the current city shape. As a result, the normalized proximity and cohesion
indices are low (i.e. 0.635 and 0.843, respectively). In contrast, Minneapolis, a city with short
commutes (i.e. average two-way commute in 2000 was 54 minutes), has a rather circular shape that
closely overlaps that of the EAC. In this case, the values of the normalized proximity and cohesion
indices are higher (i.e. 0.930 and 0.915, respectively). Panel D in Table 1 displays the descriptive
statistics for the two indices.
The proximity and cohesion indices have different underlying assumptions regarding the nature
of commuting within cities. While the proximity index considers commuting trips to the city center,
the cohesion index assumes that jobs (and homes) are homogeneously distributed within the city.
Kahn (2010) has documented that commuting times in the US are a monotonic function of the
distance to the CBD in medium-big and small MSAs. However, in metropolitan areas with more
than 4 million inhabitants, he finds a tipping point at 7 miles to the CBD. When people live more
than 7 miles away from the CBD, commuting time tends to decrease, suggesting that commutes
for people living in distant suburbs tends to be more local. Accordingly, in our sample we expect
the proximity index to predict commuting time better for small and medium-sized MSAs than for
the largest MSAs.
Figure 4 plots the values of the normalized proximity and cohesion indices against commute
time. As expected, the figure displays a negative correlation between commuting times and the
degree of compactness of a city as measured by the normalized indices.
In our framework, the possibility that dual earner couples choose to sort into more compact
cities, with shorter commuting times, poses a threat to identification. To verify the validity of our
exclusion restriction, we follow Altonji et al. (2005) and test for sorting on observable characteristics.
We restrict our sample to men and women who recently moved into the city (i.e. within the past
5 years). We test if individual characteristics that are important determinants of labor supply are
correlated with the shape of the city as captured by the two indices.9 Table 2 shows the results
for the probability of having a college degree (columns 1 and 2), the probability of being a power
couple (columns 3 and 4), the number of children (columns 5 and 6) and the probability of being
married (columns 7 and 8). The results indicates that none of the normalized index is correlated
with the observed individual characteristics considered, and support the validity of the proposed
identification strategy.
9Note that the normalized indices that we use are orthogonal to city size. This should alleviate concerns




We now turn to our main empirical exercise and estimate the effect of commuting costs on the labor
supply of men and women. Table 3 shows the OLS estimates of the empirical model in equation
1. Columns 1 to 4 focus on women and columns 5 to 8 on men. The specification in columns
1 and 5 includes only as controls the MSA population and its square (in logs). Columns 2 and
6 add regional dummies, and columns 3 and 7 the individual controls: age, education and race
dummies, and spouse income (in logs). Finally, columns 4 and 8 include the MSA controls: the %
of employment in the manufacturing sector, the % of workers employed in the public sector, median
household income (in logs) and the gender wage gap.
For women, the point estimates displayed in columns 1 to 4 suggest a negative relationship
between commuting time and labor market participation. The effect is statistically significant at
conventional levels in columns 3 and 4 when controlling for individual and MSA characteristics.
According to the estimates in our preferred specification in column 4, a 10 minutes increase in travel
time leads to a 1.8 percentage points decrease in the probability of married women to participate
in the labor market. The estimates for men are much smaller in magnitude and only statistically
significant in the last specification. As discussed in Section 4, reversed causality and sorting are
likely to bias the OLS estimate towards zero. Accordingly, the estimates in Table 3 should be
interpreted as a lower bound of the effect of commuting costs on labor force participation.
5.2 IV estimates
To deal with the endogeneity concerns we instrument commuting times using the normalized prox-
imity and cohesion indices (see Section 4). Table 4 displays the estimates of the first-stage. The
results indicate that both the normalized proximity and cohesion indices are strong predictors of
commuting times. In our preferred specification that includes controls at the MSA level (columns
3 and 4), a one standard deviation increase in the normalized proximity index (0.16) decreases
two-way commuting by 16 minutes. For the cohesion index (S.D. of 0.15) the effect is 14 minutes.
The F-test of excluded instruments indicates that the proximity index is a stronger instrument than
the cohesion index. For the proximity index the F-test is beyond 10, which is the rule-of-thumb
widely accepted by practitioners (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Instead, for the cohesion index, the
value of the F-test is just below 10. This result is consistent with our previous discussion regarding
the suitability of the proximity index to predict commuting times in small and medium size cities,
which constitute the majority of cities in our sample. It also suggests that trips to the city cen-
ter, better captured by the proximity index, are still important in the US despite the important
decentralization employment between 1960 and 2000 (Baum-Snow, 2010).
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The IV estimates of equation 1 are presented in Table 5. Panel A reports the estimates based
on the normalized proximity index while Panel B those of the cohesion index. As in Table 3,
columns 1 to 4 show the results for married women and columns 5 to 8 for married men. For
women, the estimates in all columns are larger (in absolute value) than the corresponding OLS
estimates. Also, the point estimates remains stable when regional dummies (column 2), individual
characteristics (column 3) and MSA controls (column 4) are sequentially included. This stability
in the coefficients alleviates concerns about the validity of our identification strategy (Altonji et al.,
2005). According to our preferred specification in column 4, a 10 minutes increase in commuting
decreases the probability for a married women to participate in the labor market by 4.6 percentage
points. In 2000, the participation rate of prime age women was 73%, and the estimated effect
represents a 6% decrease relative to the mean.
In columns 5 to 8 we estimate the same models for married men. The point estimates are much
smaller and statistically insignificant in most specifications, suggesting that the effect of commuting
is mostly concentrated on women. Despite being insignificant, the magnitude and sign of the
estimated coefficient suggests that longer commutes may also negatively affect the participation
decision of men. This result is consistent with a strand of the literature showing that better access
to jobs within cities improves labor market performance (Aslund et al., 2010; Gobillon et al., 2011;
Andersson et al., 2018).
Table 6 reports the estimates of the direct effect of city shape metrics on the labor force partic-
ipation of married women and men (i.e. the reduced-form estimates). Conforming to expectations,
more circular cities, with higher values of the proximity and cohesion indices , are associated with
higher rates of female labor force participation. For men, the coefficients on the indices are also
positive but statistically insignificant when control variables are included in estimation.
The evidence presented so far reveals an important gender asymmetry in the effect of commuting
costs on individuals’ labor supply. Namely, long commutes negatively affect the labor supply
decision of women, while the effect, if any, is much smaller on men. According to the point
estimates in Table 5, if commuting times in the US had remained at the 1980 level (a 26% lower
than in 2000), the labor force participation of married women would have been 3.7 percentage
points higher, which represents about 40% of the current gender gap in participation.10
5.3 Effects at the intensive margin
Now we turn the analysis to the intensive margin of the labor supply. We focus on the number of
weekly hours worked, the decision to work part-time and that of working long-hours. We define
part-time work as working less than 35 hours during a typical week and long-hours as working more
than 50 hours per week. We also investigate the effect of commuting costs on the probability of
10The current gap is at 9pp – 85 vs 76, according to 2017 ACS data.
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working in a typical part-time occupation as defined in Section 3.
We are aware that the results at the intensive margin can not be interpreted as causal, as
the decision to participate in the labor market is clearly affected by our variable of interest. For
example, it may be that only the most talented and motivated women get a job in high commuting
locations. This would bias our estimates at the intensive margin towards zero. However, we do find
these results informative about the effects of commuting on the labor market beyond the decision
to participate.
Table 7 presents the results at the intensive margin. Columns 1 and 2 report the OLS estimates
and 3 to 6 the IV estimates.11 In estimation, the sample is restricted to married women aged 25
to 55 working 52 weeks during the reference year. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the results for our
preferred specification in terms of control variables. Columns 2, 4 and 6 add occupational fixed
effects.12
The IV estimates in column 3 to 6 indicate the presence of statistically significant effects.
There is evidence that higher commuting costs reduce the number of hours worked: a 10 minutes
increase in commuting decreases hours worked per week between 0.58 and 0.72. The probability of
working part-time also increases by 2.4 percentage points when commute increases by 10 minutes.
In contrast, there is no effect on the probability of working long hours.13 Note that the results
on part-time employment and the number of hours worked do not decrease when occupation fixed
effects are included in estimation. This suggests that most of the effect occurs within occupations
rather than by sorting across occupations. This last result is also consistent with the absence of
any effect of commuting on the probability of working in an occupation with a high concentration
of part-time employment.
5.4 Robustness checks
In this section we conduct a number of empirical exercises to validate the robustness of our pre-
vious findings. The results in this section are obtained using the normalized proximity index as
instrument. The corresponding results for the normalized cohesion index, which are qualitatively
very similar, are presented in Appendix B (Tables A1 to A4).
So far we have shown the absence of sorting on the basis of observable characteristics. In
table 2 observable individual characteristics such as education and family responsibilities appeared
uncorrelated with the two instruments employed in estimation. To further explore the possibility
that sorting can be affecting our results, we estimate the model in equation 1 on a sample of
individuals that are less mobile. Unfortunately, the IPUMS microdata do not provide the county
11Columns 3 and 4 employ the proximity index as instrument and column 5 and 6 the cohesion one.
12Occupational groups at the 3-digit level as in the 1990 Census.
13The negative effect of commuting on the intensive margin are consistent with the theoretical predictions
of the model outlined in section 6.
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or city of birth, but it reports the state of birth and records the recent migration histories. With
this information, we can estimate the model on the sample of individuals who were born in the
state where they live and have not changed residence during the last 5 years. The results for this
sample are reported in Table 8. These estimates are very similar in magnitude and significance to
those in Table 5 and provide additional evidence that sorting across MSA does not seem to be the
main driver of our results.
Another concern is the presence of unobservable MSA characteristics that affect labor supply
decisions and commuting time simultaneously, such as climate or other city features that may
attrack a particular type of worker. To address this concern we estimate a model at the MSA level
where the dependent variable is the gender ratio in labor force particiaption. This specification
eliminates all unobservable city characteristics that homogeneously affect male and female labor
supply. The results of this alternative specification are presented in Table 9. The point estimates
are positive and statistically significant: a 10 minutes increase in commuting increases the gender
gap in participation by about 6 percentage points. This result is similar to the findings in Table 5
and reinforces the view that female labor supply is much more responsive to changes in the duration
of commutes.
Next we estimate the model in equation 1 in long differences between 1980 and 2000. This
specification allows us to control for unobserved MSA characteristics which are time invariant and
may have heterogenous effect across genders. Table 10 presents the IV estimates of the following
model for women:
∆FLSc = β1∆commutingc + ∆X
′
cλ+ ηc
where ∆FLSc is the percentage point change in female labor supply in city c between 1980 and
2000. ∆Commutingc is the increase in commuting time over the same period and ∆X
′
c captures
differences in the control variables at the MSA level. Changes in shapes in US cities between 1980
and 2000 are limited and, thus, we instrument ∆commutingc with the cross-sectional normalized
proximity index described in Section 4. Table 10 presents the results. Accordingly, a 1 minute
increase in commuting times reduces the labor supply fo married women between 0.79 and X,
depending on the specification. This estimated effect are close to that in Tables 5, reinforcing the
robustness of our previous findings.
Finally, we estimate the effect of commuting on labor supply at different points in time. Specif-
ically, we employ the 1990 Census, the 1980 Census and the 2006-2011 ACS samples described in
Section 3. The estimation results are reported in Table 11. Columns 1 and 3 employ data for the
period 2006-2011 and for 1990, respectively. The point estimates are very similar in magnitude to
the one obtained when using the 2000 Census (column 2). The effect for 1980 in column 4 is much
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smaller and statistically insignificant. One possible explanation is that with commuting times being
shorter in 1980, commuting was a less relevant factor to explain labor force participation.
In sum, the previous results suggest that sorting and omitted variables biases do not seem to be
driving our results. It also indicates that the role of commuting as a determinant of the individual
decisions to participate in the labor market has increased over time.
5.5 Mechanisms
The previous results uncover an important gender asymmetry in the individual responses to com-
muting costs. The theoretical framework in Section 2 suggest two possible mechanisms that can
account for the stronger response by women. First, in a two-member household, differences in
home productivity or the presence of a gender wage gap in the labor market may induce women
to withdraw from the labor force and avoid paying the cost of going to work twice. Second, the
presence of a gendered social norm may lead women to stay home and take care of the family and
other housework when commuting time increases.
To investigate the contribution of these two mechanisms in explaining the different response to
commuting costs across genders we conduct an heterogeneity analysis. We first estimate the model
in equation 1 on a sample of individuals with different levels of family responsibilities proxied by
the number of children in the households. The estimates are reported in Table 12. Columns 1 to
7 present the results for women and columns 8 to 14 for men. The effect for single women with
no children is much smaller than our baseline estimates and statistically insignificant (column 1).
Among married women, the effect is smallest for those without children: a 10 minutes increase
in commuting reduces participation by 3.35 percentage points (column 2). In the presence of
children the effect becomes larger: a 10 minutes increase in commuting decreases the probability
to participate by 4.25 percentage points for those with 1 child (column 3). This effect increases up
to 5.8 percentage points among those with 3 or more children (column 4 and 5). The estimates in
column 6 shows that the effect is magnified in the presence of young children. Accordingly, a 10
minutes increase in commuting times decreases the working probability of mothers with children
younger than 5 by 6.7 percentage points. This effect is smaller for women who have children older
than 5 years old (column 7). For men, columns 8 to 14 display a negative coefficient but much
smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant for most of the groups. These findings suggest
that the higher burden of childcare costs supported by women could be partly responsible for their
larger response to commuting times.
Next, we explore whether differences in labor market productivity are driving our findings. We
estimate the model in equation 1 on a sample of couples with different levels of education that
proxy for differences in productivity. In column 1 of Table 13, we estimate the model on couples
where both members have a college degree (i.e. power couples). Column 2 estimates it on couples
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where none of the members have college (i.e. low power couples), column 3 focuses on couples
where only the husband has a college degree (i.e. part power couples men) and, finally, column 4
on couples when only the wife has college education (i.e. part power couples women). The point
estimates of the labor supply elasticities are very similar across different samples. This evidence
suggests that differences in productivity, or the presence of a gender wage gap, are not a major
driver of the different response by men and women to commuting costs.
Finally, we investigate the implications of culture for the gender asymmetry in our findings. We
conduct an epidemiological analysis that mirrors that in Fernández and Fogli (2009), and focuses on
a sample of foreign-born individuals living in the US. The idea is that cultural attitudes regarding
the role of women in society are transmitted across generations and individuals carry these values
when moving to a new country. By comparing immigrants from different countries living in the
US, one can isolate the role of culture on individual decisions.
As explained in Section 3, we measure gender role attitudes using the World Value Survey.
Following Alesina et al. (2013), we compute the percentage of individuals in each country who
“strongly agree” or “agree” with the following two statements: “When Jobs are scarce, men have
more right to a job than women” and “Men make better political leaders than women”. To formally
examine the role of social norms, we estimate the baseline model including, as additional regressors,
the measure of gender attitudes in the country of origin (i.e. the percentage of agreement with a
traditional statement) and its interaction term with commuting time. Column 1 in Table 14 displays
the results when traditional views are proxied by the statement ”When jobs are scarce, men should
have more right to a job than women”, while column 2 shows the corresponding results for the
statement “Men make better political leaders than women”. To ease interpretation, commuting
time and gender attitudes have been demeaned. Thus, the coefficient of commuting represents
its impact at average values of gender attitudes. Note that the interaction term also needs to be
instrumented. We instrument commuting times and its interaction with the proxy for gender roles
with the normalized proximity index and its iteraction term with the corresponding gender roles
proxy. 14. The F-statistics indicate that the two instruments are relevant predictors of the two
endogenous variables.
Our coefficient of interest is the interaction term between the attitudes’ measure and commuting
times. This interaction term is negative in both columns, suggesting that the effect of commuting
times on the labor force participation of married women is exacerbated by gender norms. Figure
5 shows the implied marginal effects for observed values in gender attittudes. These results are
consistent with the hypothesis that social norms may lead women to stay home and take care of
the family and other housework when commuting time increases.
The findings in this section allow us to conclude that differences in labor market productivity
14Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage statistics for models with more than one endogenous vari-
ables are provided at the bottom of Table 14
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do not seem to be driving the asymmetric gender response to commuting costs. In contrast, we
find that the presence of family responsibilities reinforced by the existence of gendered social norms
that make more costly for men to stay home seem responsible for the stronger response by women
to increases in commuting times.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of commuting costs on the labor supply decisions of men and
women. We uncover an important gender asymmetry. Namely, women with larger family respon-
sibilities respond the most to increases in travel times, while the effect is non-significant among
men and unmarried women. We extend the model in Black et al. (2014) to investigate the po-
tential mechanisms driving these results. The model predicts that differences in home and market
productivity and/or the presence of traditional gender norms about the role of men and women in
society may explain the differential effect of travel times across genders. In our empirical analysis,
we do not observe important differences in the response of family members with different levels of
education, suggesting that productivity gaps are not likely to explain the gender asymetry in our
results. In contrast, using a sample of female immigrants living in the US, we do find that those
originating from countries with more traditional views are more responsive to changes in commut-
ing costs. We interpret this finding as evidence that the presence of a social norm that makes more
costly for men to stay home may explain the larger response by married women with more family
responsibilities. Our findings are relevant for policy makers, as they identify a potential cause for
the stagnation of female labor force participation during recent decades. The increase in congestion
and excessive agglomeration in cities may be partly counterbalancing the increase in female labor
supply observed since the late 1950s. Thus reducing commuting costs by investing, for instance, in
transport infrastrucutre and urban planning can facilitate female participation in the labor market
and promote gender equality.
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Figure 1: Commuting Costs and Household Labor Supply
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Both Work Only Man Works Only Woman Works
Panel A: wm = wf ; am = af
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Both Work Only Man Works Only Woman Works
Panel B: wm > wf ; am = af
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Both Work Only Man Works Only Woman Works
Panel C: wm = wf ; am > af
Notes: This figure displays 3 different scenarios of home and market specialization. Utility is the sum of individual utilities
in the household. The black line represents the household utility when both members work. The dotted line represents the
utility when only the husband works, while the dashed line represents the utility when only the wife works. Panel A illustrates
a symmetric situation where there is no gender gap in wages and gender roles are egalitarian. Panel B illustrates a situation
where there is a wage gap that favors men and gender roles are egalitarian. In Panel C there is no gender wage gap but gender
norms favor the male breadwinner culture.
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Note: The graph displays the percentage of respondents in each country that agree or strongly agree with
the statement: ”When Jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (y-axis) and ”Men
make better political leaders than women do”(x-axis). Each point represents a country. The size of the
dot ilustrates the magnitude of each immigrant group in the US population in 2000. Source: World Value
Survey. Several years between 2000 and 2011.
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Figure 3: City Shape and Equivalent Area Circle (EAC)
Note: The dark area represents the city actual shape. The circle contains the city area (i.e. Equivalent Area
Circle, EAC). The point represents the city Central Business District. The values of the normalized proximity
and cohesion indices for Chicago are 0.695 and 0.843, respectively and 0.930 and 0.915 for Minneapolis.
Source: NHGIS Urban Area Maps, 2000.
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Note: The graph plots the value of the normalized proximity (Panel A) and cohesion indices (Panel
B) and the average two-way commuting time for working white men in each MSA. The size of the
circle represents the population size. Source: 5% 2000 US Census IPUMS sample.
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Note: This graph plots the marginal effect (implied by estimates in Table 14) of an increase in commuting
time on the labor force participation of married women as a function of gender attitudes in the country of
origin. Shadowed bands are 95% confidence intervals.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: MSA variables, CCDB 2000 # cities Mean Sd Min Max
Commuting 272 0.51 0.08 0.34 0.84
Population 272 755,150 1,251,024 101,541 9,519,338
Median City Income 272 16,674 2,719 10,650 23,958
% Manufacturing Employment 272 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.59
% Public Employment 272 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.49
% Poor 272 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.35
% College education 272 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.23
Gender wage gap 272 16,486 3,458 7,405 29,450
Panel B: Individual variables, IPUMS 2000 # indiv.
Married Women
Labor Force 1,382,904 0.7 0.46 0 1
Weekly Hours Worked 610,069 39.55 9.98 1 99
Part Time employment 610,069 0.17 0.37 0 1
Working Long Hours 610,069 0.14 0.34 0 1
Part Time Occupation (25th Pctile) 610,069 0.28 0.45 0 1
Part Time Occupation (10th Pctile) 610,069 0.13 0.34 0 1
Age 1,382,904 40.29 8.27 25 55
Spousal Income 1,382,904 46,537 54,378 0 354,000
Children 1,382,904 0.71 0.45 0 1
Children<5 1,382,904 0.23 0.42 0 1
College 1,382,904 0.3 0.46 0 1
White 1,382,904 0.71 0.46 0 1
Married Men
Labor Force 1,349,163 0.89 0.31 0 1
Weekly Hours Worked 912,261 46.3 9.84 1 99
Part Time employment 912,261 0.02 0.15 0 1
Working Long Hours 912,261 0.36 0.48 0 1
Part Time Occupation (25th Pctile) 912,261 0.24 0.43 0 1
Part Time Occupation (10th Pctile) 912,261 0.11 0.31 0 1
Age 1,349,163 40.81 8.19 25 55
Spousal Income 1,349,163 19,492 27,165 0 354,000
Children 1,349,163 0.7 0.46 0 1
Children<5 1,349,163 0.25 0.43 0 1
College 1,349,163 0.33 0.47 0 1
White 1,349,163 0.7 0.46 0 1
Panel C: City Shape measures, NHGIS 2000 # cities
nProximity 272 0.67 0.16 0.11 0.95
nCohesion 272 0.71 0.15 0.21 1
Notes: Commuting is defined as two-way door-to-door travel time to work in minutes for white male workers divided by 100. Hours worked
are average weekly hours worked in 1999. Part-time employment is defined as working less than 35 hours per week. Working long hours is
defined as working more than 50 hours per week. Sources: Data in Panel A are obtained from the US County and City Data Book (CCDB).
Data in Panel B from the 2000 Census. Data in Panel C form the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS) in 2000.
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Table 2: City Shape and Individual Characteristics of Migrants – OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
College Education Power Couple noChildren Married
Married Women All Married Women All Women
nProximity -0.005 0.009 0.037 -0.003
(0.024) (0.022) (0.050) (0.012)
nCohesion 0.006 0.017 -0.005 -0.010
(0.036) (0.031) (0.076) (0.018)
Observations 236,434 484,519 236,434 399,632
Notes: The sample includes married men and women between 25 and 55 years old who changed MSA of residence in
the last 5 years. Each column corresponds to a different dependent variable (i.e. the probability of having a college
degree (column 1), the probability of being a power couple (2), the number of children (3) and the probability of
being married (4). The rows present the estimated coefficient for different regressions on the normalized proximity
index (nProximity) and the normalized cohesion index (nCohesion). All regressions include controls at the individual
level (age, education and race dummies and spouse income in logs), controls at the MSA level (% employment in
manufacturing, % employment in the public sector, MSA median household income in logs, the gender wage gap
and population and its squared term in logs) and regional dummies. Standard errors clustered at the MSA level in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: 5% 2000 US Census IPUMS.
Table 3: Effect of Commuting Time on Labor Force Participation – OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Married Women Married Men
Commuting -0.082 -0.063 -0.124*** -0.176*** -0.021 0.010 -0.008 -0.049***
(0.093) (0.052) (0.026) (0.025) (0.072) (0.040) (0.019) (0.015)
Observations 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,349,163 1,349,163 1,349,163 1,349,163
Region Dummies NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
MSA Controls NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if the individual is in the labor force and 0 otherwise. Commuting
is the average MSA two-way commuting time for white male workers divided by 100. The sample is restricted to married women and
men between 25 and 55 years old. All regressions include population and its squared term in logs. Individual controls are: age, education
level and race dummies and the log of spouse income. MSA controls include: % employment in manufacturing, % employment in the
public sector, MSA median household income in logs and gender wage gap. Standard errors clustered at the MSA level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Effect of City Shape on Commuting Time – First Stage Estimates





Observations 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,382,904
F-stat (Excl. Inst.) 24.46 13.56 16.72 9.82
Region Dummies NO NO YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES YES
MSA Controls NO NO YES YES
Notes: The dependent variable is the average two-way commuting time for white male workers
at the MSA level divided by 100. The explanatory variables are the normalized proximity index
(first row) and the normalized cohesion index (second row). The sample is restricted to married
women between 25 and 55 years old. All regressions include population and its squared term
in logs. Columns 3 and 4 include region dummies, individual and MSA controls as defined in
Table 3. F-stat is the value of the statistics for the test of excluded instruments. Standard
errors clustered at the MSA level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Effect of Commuting Time on Labor Force Participation – 2SLS
Panel A– Instrument: nProximity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Married Women Married Men
Commuting -0.301 -0.394** -0.392*** -0.465*** -0.131 -0.133 -0.064 -0.065
(0.242) (0.191) (0.121) (0.113) (0.163) (0.120) (0.060) (0.068)
Observations 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,349,163 1,349,163 1,349,163 1,349,163
F-Stat (Excl. Instr.) 19.740 12.836 13.158 16.270 19.395 12.529 12.741 15.467
Panel B– Instrument: nCohesion
Married Women Married Men
Commuting -0.491** -0.444* -0.357*** -0.388*** -0.321** -0.226 -0.113 -0.127
(0.207) (0.235) (0.137) (0.117) (0.134) (0.147) (0.0760) (0.0863)
Observations 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,349,163 1,349,163 1,349,163 1,349,163
F-stat (Excl. Instr) 13.558 7.453 7.579 9.828 13.269 7.339 7.416 9.535
Region Dummies NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
MSA Controls NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if the individual is in the labor force and 0 otherwise. Commuting
is the average MSA two-way commuting time for white male workers divided by 100. The sample is restricted to married women and men
between 25 and 55 years old. All regressions include population and its squared term in logs. Individual and MSA controls as defined in Table
3. In Panel A the instrument is the normalized proximity index while in Panel B it is the normalized cohesion index. F-stat is the value of the
statistic for the test of excluded instruments. Standard errors clustered at the MSA level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6: Effect of City Shape on Labor Force Participation – Reduced Form Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Married Women Married Men
nProximity 0.050** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.022 0.018 0.008 0.006
(0.034) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.025) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007)
nCohesion 0.083*** 0.056*** 0.045*** 0.041*** 0.054*** 0.029* 0.014 0.013
(0.029) (0.022) (0.014) (0.011) (0.02) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,382,904 1,349,163 1,349,163 1,349,163 1,349,163
Region Dummies NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
MSA Controls NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if the individual is in the labor force and 0 otherwise.
The sample is restricted to married women and men between 25 and 55 years old. Individual and MSA controls as defined in
Table 3. Standard errors clustered at the MSA level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
27
Table 7: Effect of Commuting Time on the Intensive Margin, Married Women – 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
OLS Estimates IV Estimates
Hours Worked -0.809 -0.826 -5.801** -6.840** -6.405* -7.202*
(0.600) (0.573) (2.501) (2.671) (3.804) (3.925)
Part-time 0.027 0.030 0.225** 0.243** 0.227 0.238*
(0.026) (0.024) (0.107) (0.106) (0.146) (0.144)
Long Hours -0.003 0.001 -0.019 -0.060 -0.075 -0.108
(0.012) (0.011) (0.053) (0.052) (0.079) (0.081)
Part Time Occupation (10%) -0.019 – -0.037 – -0.036 –
(0.022) – (0.078) – (0.088) –
Part Time Occupation (25%) -0.018 – 0.007 – 0.036 –
(0.022) – (0.068) – (0.078) –
Observations 602,811 602,811 602,811 602,811 602,811 602,811
F-stat (Excl. Instr) – – 19.011 19.086 11.446 11.454
Instrument – – nProximity nProximity nCohesion nCohesion
Occupation Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: Hours worked refers to the regular number of hours worked per week. Part-time is defined as working less than 35
hours per week. Long-hours is defined as working more than 50 hours per week. Part Time Occupation (10% and 25%)
are indicator variables that equal 1 if the occupation is at the top 10th or 25th percentile of the distribution of part-time
employment across all occupations. Commuting is the average MSA two-way commuting time for white male workers divided
by 100. The sample is restricted to married women between 25 and 55 years old who worked 52 weeks during the last year. All
regressions include population and its squared term in logs. Individual and MSA controls as defined in Table 3. Occupation
Fixed Effects controls for 1990 Census occupational group fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 use nProximity index as instrument,
while columns 5 and 6 use the nCohesion index as instrument. F-stat is the value of the statistic for the test of excluded
instruments. Standard errors clustered at the MSA level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Effect of Commuting Time on Labor Force Participation of married women, Non-
Movers Sample – 2SLS (Proximity index)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Commuting -0.353*** -0.345*** -0.439*** -0.427***
(0.150) (0.135) (0.137) (0.091)
Observations 395,689 395,689 395,689 395,689
F-stat (Excl. Instr) 22.195 14.407 14.846 27.027
Region Dummies NO YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES YES
MSA Controls NO NO NO YES
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if the individual is in the
labor force and 0 otherwise. Commuting is the average MSA two-way commuting time for white
male workers divided by 100. The sample is restricted to married women between 25 and 55
years old, born in the same state as they currently live and who did not change residence during
the last 5 years. All regressions include population and its squared term in logs. Individual and
MSA controls as defined in Table 3. Estimations are based on the normalized proximity index.
The estimates for the cohesion index are in Table A1. F-stat is the value of the statistic for the
test of excluded instruments. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 9: Effect of Commuting Time on the Gender Gap in Labor Force Participation – 2SLS
(Proximity Index)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Commuting 0.982*** 0.894*** 0.802*** 0.915***
(0.292) (0.229) (0.294) (0.295)
Observations 272 272 272 272
F-stat (Excl. Instr) 16.663 28.495 26.208 17.556
Population NO YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES YES
MSA Controls NO NO NO YES
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio between male and female labor force partici-
pation at the city level. Commuting is the average two-way commuting time at the city
level for white male workers. Data comes from collapsing 5% 2000 US Census IPUMS data
at the MSA level and the 2000 CCDB. Population includes log population and its square
term. Individual and MSA controls as defined in Table 3. Individual Controls are collapsed
averages from the same individual controls as in Table 3: Share of college education, mean
age and share of white people. The estimations are based on the normalized proximity
index. The estimates for the cohesion index are in Table A2. F-stat is the value of the
statistic for the test of excluded instruments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: Effect of Commuting Time on the Labor Force Participation of Married Women
– First Differences, 2SLS (Proximity Index)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Commuting -0.799** -0.830*** -0.772** -0.992**
(0.327) (0.308) (0.311) (0.532)
Observations 238 238 238 238
F-stat (Excl. Instr) 10.067 10.302 9.683 4.978
Population NO YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES YES
MSA Controls NO NO NO YES
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage point change in married women labor
force participation between 2000 and 1980. ∆ Commuting is the change in commuting time
between 1980 and 2000. Data comes from collapsing 5% 2000 and 1980 US Census IPUMS
data at the MSA level, the 2000 CCDB and NHGIS. Population is the 1980 log population
and its squared term. Individual and MSA controls as defined in Table 3. Individual
Controls are collapsed and differenced averages from the same individual controls as in
Table 3: Share of college education, mean age and share of white people. MSA controls
include income growth rate, the change in the share of poor, the change in gender wage
gap, the change in population and the change in the share of college graduates between
1980 and 2000. Estimations are based on the normalized proximity index. The estimates
based on the cohesion index are in Table A3. F-stat is the value of the statistic for the test
of excluded instruments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 11: Effect of Commuting Time on the Labor Force Participation of Married Women
– 2SLS (Proximity Index)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2006-2011 2000 1990 1980
Commuting -0.560*** -0.465*** -0.477*** -0.135
(0.197) (0.113) (0.138) (0.147)
Observations 1,394,373 1,382,904 1,156,111 1,076,704
F-stat (Excl. Instr) 8.82 16.270 16.718 22.089
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if the
individual is in the labor force and 0 otherwise. Commuting is the average MSA
two-way commuting time for white male workers divided by 100. The sample is
restricted to married women between 25 and 55 years old. All regressions include
population and its squared term in logs. Individual and MSA controls as defined
in Table 3. Estimations are based on the normalized proximity index. The results
for the cohesion index are presented in Table A4. F-stat is the value of the statistic
for the test of excluded instruments. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample:
5% US 2000, 1990 and 1980 Census IPUMS and 2006-2011 Pooled ACS
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Table 12: Effect of Commuting Time on Labor Force Participation in the Presence of Family Responsibilities – 2SLS
(Proximity Index)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Single w/o Children 1 Child 2 Children ≥ 3 Children Children < 5yo Children > 5yo Single w/o Children 1 Child 2 Children ≥ 3 Children Children <5yo Children >5yo
Married Women Married Men
Commuting -0.149 -0.335*** -0.425*** -0.585*** -0.580*** -0.670*** -0.377*** -0.075 -0.068 -0.148*** -0.052 0.018 -0.074 -0.069
(0.107) (0.103) (0.115) (0.137) (0.186) (0.177) (0.106) (0.062) (0.156) (0.052) (0.057) (0.070) (0.0621) (0.047)
Observations 458,578 403,069 335,857 402,550 241,428 403,069 658,380 648,343 399,091 319,676 394,655 235,741 340,311 609,761
F-stat (Excl. Instr) 18.644 17.174 17.806 16.347 12.211 14.786 16.172 17.410 15.319 17.238 16.076 12.024 14.547 15.820
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if the individual is in the labor force and 0 otherwise. Commuting is the average MSA two-way commuting time for white male workers divided by 100. All
regressions include population and its squared term in logs. Individual and MSA controls as defined in Table 3. Instrument used is normalized proximity. F-stat is the value of the statistic for the test of excluded instruments.
Standard errors clustered at the MSA level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 13: Effect of Commuting Time on Labor Force Participation by Educational Charac-
teristics of Couples – 2SLS (Proximity Index)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power Couple Low Power Part Power (Man) Part Power (Woman)
Panel A: Married Women
Commuting -0.354*** -0.417*** -0.681*** -0.443***
(0.127) (0.109) (0.214) (0.119)
Observations 293,063 760,698 201,318 127,825
Adjusted R-squared 0.022 0.039 0.014 0.015
F-test (Excl. Instr) 19.374 13.943 14.862 18.535
Panel B: Married Men
Commuting -0.124 0.019 -0.135*** 0.081
(0.085) (0.081) (0.048) (0.291)
Observations 282,803 729,392 156,879 180,089
F-stat (Excl. Instr) 19.498 13.267 15.477 14.051
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if the individual is in the labor force and 0 otherwise.
Commuting is the average MSA two-way commuting time for white male workers divided by 100. As in Costa and Kahn
(2000), Power couples are defined as couples in which both spouses have at least college education (+4 years of college
education). Low power couples are defined as couples in which both spouses have less than college education. Part power
couples are those in which one spouse has at least college education while the other has not. All regressions include
population and its squared term in logs. Individual and MSA controls as defined in Table 3. Instrument used is normalized
proximity. F-stat is the value of the statistic for the test of excluded instruments. Standard errors clustered at the MSA
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 14: Effect of Commuting Time on the Labor Force Participation of Immigrant Married
Women – 2SLS
(1) (2)
LFP married women interacted with When jobs are scarce... Men better leaders...
Commuting (minutes) -0.034 -0.040
(0.058) (0.094)
Commuting × Gender attittudes -0.796*** -0.972***
(0.045) (0.324)
Gender attitudes 0.019 0.036
(0.078) (0.077)
Sanderson-Windmeijer F Statistic (Commuting) 26.10 94.30
Sanderson-Windmeijer F Statistic (Interaction term) 4.16 4.76
Observations 472,702 472,702
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if the individual is in the labor force
and 0 otherwise. Commuting is the average MSA two-way commuting time for white male workers divided
by 100. Gender Attitudes are the share of agreement with each WVS statement by country of origin. Each
column uses a different question from the WVS (given in column headers): “When jobs are scarce, men
should have more right to a job than women” (1) and “Men make better political leaders than women
do” (2). Sample (5% 2000 US Census IPUMS and 2006-2011 pooled ACS) is restricted to married women
aged between 25 and 55 years who were born outside the US. All regressions include log population and its
squared term, year fixed effects, and individual controls, MSA controls and region dummies as in Table 3.
Instruments used are the normalized proximity and the interaction between the share of agreement with a
WVS statement and the normalized proximity index. Sanderson-Windmeijer F-statistic is the value of the
statistic for the test of excluded instruments when there are two or more endogenous variables. Two-way
clustered standard errors (MSA and country of birth) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
34
Appendix A
In this appendix we detail the solution to the model outlined in Section 2. When both spouses
work, the optimal amount of consumption, time at home and the transfer are determined by:















The optimal transfer is proportional to the wage gap, so that low wage individuals receive
a positive transfer and viceversa. The consumption of individual j depends on own preferences
(αj) and the average household wage. Time spent at home depends on own preferences to stay at
home, (1 − αj), and it increases when the individual wage decreases relative to that of the other
spouse. Higher commuting costs, k, reduce the time available to work in the market and at home.
Accordingly, these costs can be interpreted as a negative income effect.
Let us now analyze the optimal outcomes when only one spouse participates in the labor market.
Here, we analyze the case in which the woman stays home and, thus, does not incur in commuting
costs. Interchanging the gender subscripts gives the solution in which the man stays at home.
When the woman stays home, loneworksf = 1, consumption equals the transfer received from the
spouse that participates (coneworksf = y
oneworks). The optimal amount of consumption and leisure













Commuting costs also decrease the consumption and the amount of time spent at home by the
spouse who works. However, when only one spouse works, the level of consumption and time spent
at home depends on the preferences of the two members of the household.
In order to analyze how commuting affects household utility, we differentiate utility with respect




































The two expressions are negative, indicating that commuting decreases utility. Note that αf < 1
implies that the utility of the household when both spouses work is more sensitive to changes in
commuting costs as these are paid twice. This implies that for certain parameter configurations,
an increase in k will induce some households to specialize.
We now turn to analyze who will stay home when commuting costs are high and it is not
optimal for both spouses to work. We first analyze the role of wages by assuming that preferences
are homogeneous (αm = αf ). Equations A4 and A6 indicate that the consumption of the two
household members will be higher if the individual who works is the one with the higher wage. The
time spent at home is lj = 1 for the spouse who stays and A5 for the working member, implying
that the time spent at home does not depend on the wage of the household member that works.
As a result, household utility is higher when the low wage worker stays home.
We now turn to the case in which wages are equal but preferences are not. As explained above,
αm > αf might reflect women being intrinsically more productive at domestic work or social
norms that make staying at home less desirable for men. The consumption for both members
is higher when only the man works compared to the case where only the woman works. Hence,
both individuals enjoy more consumption when the high αj person works. As for the utility
derived from time at home, it turns out that the utility loss experienced by the woman if she
works, αf (ln(1)− ln(loneworksf )), is larger than the utility loss experienced by the man if he works,
αm(ln(1) − ln(loneworksm )). Hence, if αm > αf , the woman will stay at home as they both enjoy
higher consumption levels and the cost of spending less time at home is lower for the man.
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Appendix B
Table A1: Effect of Commuting Time on the Labor Force Participation of Married Women.
Non-Movers Sample – 2SLS (Cohesion index).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Commuting -0.407** -0.435** -0.458*** -0.392***
(0.188) (0.192) (0.176) (0.138)
Observations 395,689 395,689 395,689 395,689
Region Dummies NO YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES YES
MSA Controls NO NO NO YES
F-test 14.079 7.716 7.743 13.735
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if the individual is in
the labor force and 0 otherwise. Commuting is the average MSA two-way commuting time
for white male workers, divided by 100. The sample is restricted to married women between
25 and 55 years old, born in the same state as they currently live and who did not change
residence during the last 5 years. All regressions include log population and its squared term as
controls. Individual controls are: age, education level and race dummies and the log of spouse
income. MSA controls include: the share of employment in the manufacturing sector, the share
of employment in the public sector, the MSA median income and gender wage gap. Estimations
are based on the normalized cohesion index. F-test is the value of the statistic for the test of
excluded instruments. Standard errors clustered at the MSA level in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A2: Effect of Commuting Time on the Gender Gap in Labor Force Participation –
2SLS (Cohesion Index)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Commuting 1.140*** 0.980*** 0.859*** 1.005***
(0.352) (0.268) (0.319) (0.349)
Observations 272 272 272 272
Population NO YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES YES
MSA Controls NO NO NO YES
F-Stat (Excl. Instr.) 13.189 24.975 24.277 16.794
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio between male and female labor force participation
at the city level. Commuting is the average two-way commuting time at the city level for
white male workers. Data comes from collapsing 5% 2000 US Census IPUMS data at the MSA
level and the 2000 CCDB. Population includes log population and its square term. Individual
and MSA controls as defined in Table 3. Individual Controls are collapsed averages from the
same individual controls: Share of college education, mean age and share of white people.
The estimations are based on the normalized cohesion index. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A3: Effect of Commuting Time on the Labor Force Participation of Married Women–
First Differences 2SLS (Cohesion Index)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Commuting -0.839* -0.803* -0.825* -0.842*
(0.344) (0.318) (0.383) (0.425)
Observations 238 238 238 238
Population NO YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES YES
MSA Controls NO NO NO YES
F-Stat (Excl. Instr.) 9.133 9.438 6.496 5.913
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage point change in married women
labor force participation between 2000 and 1980. ∆ Commuting is the change in
commuting time between 1980 and 2000. Data comes from collapsing 5% 2000 and
1980 US Census IPUMS data at the MSA level, the 2000 CCDB and NHGIS. Popu-
lation is the 1980 log population and its squared term. Individual and MSA controls
as defined in Table 3. Individual Controls are collapsed averages from the same in-
dividual controls: Share of college education, mean age and share of white people.
Estimations are based on the cohesion proximity index. F-test is the value of the
statistic for the test of excluded instruments. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A4: Effect of Commuting Time on the Labor Force Participation of Married Women
– 2SLS (Cohesion index).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2006-2011 2000 1990 1980
Commuting -0.502** -0.388*** -0.387*** -0.208
(0.251) (0.118) (0.128) (0.181)
Observations 1,394,373 1,382,904 1,156,111 1,075,956
F-test 4.115 9.826 9.567 12.372
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes value 1
if the individual is in the labor force and 0 otherwise. Commuting is the
average MSA two-way commuting time for white male workers, divided
by 100. The sample is restricted to married women between 25 and 55
years old. All regressions include log population and its squared term as
controls; individual controls are: age, education level and race dummies
and the log of spouse income; MSA controls: the share of employment in
the manufacturing sector, the share of employment in the public sector,
the MSA median income and gender wage gap and regional dummies.
Estimations are based on the normalized Cohesion index. F-test is the
value of the statistic for the test of excluded instruments. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: 5% US 2000, 1990 and 1980 Census IPUMS





IEB Working Papers  
2015 
 
2015/1, Foremny, D.; Freier, R.; Moessinger, M-D.; Yeter, M.: "Overlapping political budget cycles in the 
legislative and the executive" 
2015/2, Colombo, L.; Galmarini, U.: "Optimality and distortionary lobbying: regulating tobacco consumption" 
2015/3, Pellegrino, G.: "Barriers to innovation: Can firm age help lower them?" 
2015/4, Hémet, C.: "Diversity and employment prospects: neighbors matter!" 
2015/5, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions" 
2015/6, Choi, A.; Jerrim, J.: "The use (and misuse) of Pisa in guiding policy reform: the case of Spain" 
2015/7, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Salvadori, L.: "Empirical evidence on tax cooperation between 
sub-central administrations" 
2015/8, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Analysing the sensitivity of electricity system operational costs 
to deviations in supply and demand" 
2015/9, Salvadori, L.: "Does tax enforcement counteract the negative effects of terrorism? A case study of the 
Basque Country" 
2015/10, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "How time shapes crime: the temporal impacts of football matches on 
crime" 
2015/11, Piolatto, A.: "Online booking and information: competition and welfare consequences of review 
aggregators" 
2015/12, Boffa, F.; Pingali, V.; Sala, F.: "Strategic investment in merchant transmission: the impact of capacity 
utilization rules" 
2015/13, Slemrod, J.: "Tax administration and tax systems" 
2015/14, Arqué-Castells, P.; Cartaxo, R.M.; García-Quevedo, J.; Mira Godinho, M.: "How inventor royalty 
shares affect patenting and income in Portugal and Spain" 
2015/15, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "Measuring the negative externalities of a private leisure activity: 
hooligans and pickpockets around the stadium" 
2015/16, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Costa-Campi, M.T.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Unexpected consequences of 
liberalisation: metering, losses, load profiles and cost settlement in Spain’s electricity system" 
2015/17, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Impacts of intermittent renewable generation on electricity 
system costs" 
2015/18, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Paniagua, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Are energy market integrations a green light for 
FDI?" 
2015/19, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Sánchez-Vidal, M.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Big plant closures and agglomeration 
economies" 
2015/20, Garcia-López, M.A.; Hémet, C.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "How does transportation shape 
intrametropolitan growth? An answer from the regional express rail" 
2015/21, Esteller-Moré, A.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.: "Fiscal equalization under political pressures" 
2015/22, Escardíbul, J.O.; Afcha, S.: "Determinants of doctorate holders’ job satisfaction. An analysis by 
employment sector and type of satisfaction in Spain" 
2015/23, Aidt, T.; Asatryan, Z.; Badalyan, L.; Heinemann, F.: "Vote buying or (political) business (cycles) as 
usual?" 
2015/24, Albæk, K.: "A test of the ‘lose it or use it’ hypothesis in labour markets around the world" 
2015/25, Angelucci, C.; Russo, A.: "Petty corruption and citizen feedback" 
2015/26, Moriconi, S.; Picard, P.M.; Zanaj, S.: "Commodity taxation and regulatory competition" 
2015/27, Brekke, K.R.; Garcia Pires, A.J.; Schindler, D.; Schjelderup, G.: "Capital taxation and imperfect 
competition: ACE vs. CBIT" 
2015/28, Redonda, A.: "Market structure, the functional form of demand and the sensitivity of the vertical reaction 
function" 
2015/29, Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.; Simón, H.: "An analysis of wage differentials between full-and part-time 
workers in Spain" 
2015/30, Garcia-López, M.A.; Pasidis, I.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Express delivery to the suburbs the effects of 
transportation in Europe’s heterogeneous cities" 
2015/31, Torregrosa, S.: "Bypassing progressive taxation: fraud and base erosion in the Spanish income tax (1970-
2001)" 
2015/32, Choi, H.; Choi, A.: "When one door closes: the impact of the hagwon curfew on the consumption of 
private tutoring in the republic of Korea" 
2015/33, Escardíbul, J.O.; Helmy, N.: "Decentralisation and school autonomy impact on the quality of education: 
the case of two MENA countries" 
2015/34, González-Val, R.; Marcén, M.: "Divorce and the business cycle: a cross-country analysis" 
2015/35, Calero, J.; Choi, A.: "The distribution of skills among the European adult population and unemployment: a 
comparative approach" 




IEB Working Papers  
2015/37, Daniele, G.: "Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’ 
ability" 
2015/38, González-Val, R.; Marcén, M.: "Regional unemployment, marriage, and divorce" 
2015/39, Foremny, D.; Jofre-Monseny, J.; Solé-Ollé, A.: "‘Hold that ghost’: using notches to identify manipulation 
of population-based grants" 
2015/40, Mancebón, M.J.; Ximénez-de-Embún, D.P.; Mediavilla, M.; Gómez-Sancho, J.M.: "Does educational 
management model matter? New evidence for Spain by a quasiexperimental approach" 
2015/41, Daniele, G.; Geys, B.: "Exposing politicians’ ties to criminal organizations: the effects of local government 
dissolutions on electoral outcomes in Southern Italian municipalities" 





2016/1, Galletta, S.: "Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: evidence from a quasi-experiment 
in Italy" 
2016/2, Flatley, L.; Giulietti, M.; Grossi, L.; Trujillo-Baute, E.; Waterson, M.: "Analysing the potential 
economic value of energy storage" 
2016/3, Calero, J.; Murillo Huertas, I.P.; Raymond Bara, J.L.: "Education, age and skills: an analysis using the 
PIAAC survey" 
2016/4, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Daví-Arderius, D.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "The economic impact of electricity losses" 
2016/5, Falck, O.; Heimisch, A.; Wiederhold, S.: "Returns to ICT skills" 
2016/6, Halmenschlager, C.; Mantovani, A.: "On the private and social desirability of mixed bundling in 
complementary markets with cost savings" 
2016/7, Choi, A.; Gil, M.; Mediavilla, M.; Valbuena, J.: "Double toil and trouble: grade retention and academic 
performance" 
2016/8, González-Val, R.: "Historical urban growth in Europe (1300–1800)" 
2016/9, Guio, J.; Choi, A.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "Labor markets, academic performance and the risk of school dropout: 
evidence for Spain" 
2016/10, Bianchini, S.; Pellegrino, G.; Tamagni, F.: "Innovation strategies and firm growth" 
2016/11, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Silva, J.I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "Local labor market effects of public employment" 
2016/12, Sanchez-Vidal, M.: "Small shops for sale! The effects of big-box openings on grocery stores" 
2016/13, Costa-Campi, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.; Martínez-Ros, E.: "What are the determinants of investment 
in environmental R&D?" 
2016/14, García-López, M.A; Hémet, C.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Next train to the polycentric city: The effect of 
railroads on subcenter formation" 
2016/15, Matas, A.; Raymond, J.L.; Dominguez, A.: "Changes in fuel economy: An analysis of the Spanish car 
market" 
2016/16, Leme, A.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "The effect of a specialized versus a general upper secondary school 
curriculum on students’ performance and inequality. A difference-in-differences cross country comparison" 
2016/17, Scandurra, R.I.; Calero, J.: “Modelling adult skills in OECD countries” 
2016/18, Fernández-Gutiérrez, M.; Calero, J.: “Leisure and education: insights from a time-use analysis” 
2016/19, Del Rio, P.; Mir-Artigues, P.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: “Analysing the impact of renewable energy regulation 
on retail electricity prices” 
2016/20, Taltavull de la Paz, P.; Juárez, F.; Monllor, P.: “Fuel Poverty: Evidence from housing perspective” 
2016/21, Ferraresi, M.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.; Zanardi, A.: “Switch towards tax centralization in Italy: A wake 
up for the local political budget cycle” 
2016/22, Ferraresi, M.; Migali, G.; Nordi, F.; Rizzo, L.: “Spatial interaction in local expenditures among Italian 
municipalities: evidence from Italy 2001-2011” 
2016/23, Daví-Arderius, D.; Sanin, M.E.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: “CO2 content of electricity losses” 
2016/24, Arqué-Castells, P.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Banking the unbanked: Evidence from the Spanish banking 
expansion plan“ 
2016/25 Choi, Á.; Gil, M.; Mediavilla, M.; Valbuena, J.: “The evolution of educational inequalities in Spain: 
Dynamic evidence from repeated cross-sections” 
2016/26, Brutti, Z.: “Cities drifting apart: Heterogeneous outcomes of decentralizing public education” 
2016/27, Backus, P.; Cubel, M.; Guid, M.; Sánchez-Pages, S.; Lopez Manas, E.: “Gender, competition and 
performance: evidence from real tournaments” 
2016/28, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.: “Innovation strategies of energy firms” 
2016/29, Daniele, G.; Dipoppa, G.: “Mafia, elections and violence against politicians” 






IEB Working Papers  
2017 
 
2017/1, González Pampillón, N.; Jofre-Monseny, J.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Can urban renewal policies reverse 
neighborhood ethnic dynamics?” 
2017/2, Gómez San Román, T.: “Integration of DERs on power systems: challenges and opportunities” 
2017/3, Bianchini, S.; Pellegrino, G.: “Innovation persistence and employment dynamics” 
2017/4, Curto‐Grau, M.; Solé‐Ollé, A.; Sorribas‐Navarro, P.: “Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?” 
2017/5, Solé‐Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Housing booms and busts and local fiscal policy” 
2017/6, Esteller, A.; Piolatto, A.; Rablen, M.D.: “Taxing high-income earners: Tax avoidance and mobility” 
2017/7, Combes, P.P.; Duranton, G.; Gobillon, L.: “The production function for housing: Evidence from France” 
2017/8, Nepal, R.; Cram, L.; Jamasb, T.; Sen, A.: “Small systems, big targets: power sector reforms and renewable 
energy development in small electricity systems” 
2017/9, Carozzi, F.; Repetto, L.: “Distributive politics inside the city? The political economy of Spain’s plan E” 
2017/10, Neisser, C.: “The elasticity of taxable income: A meta-regression analysis” 
2017/11, Baker, E.; Bosetti, V.; Salo, A.: “Finding common ground when experts disagree: robust portfolio decision 
analysis” 
2017/12, Murillo, I.P; Raymond, J.L; Calero, J.: “Efficiency in the transformation of schooling into competences:  
A cross-country analysis using PIAAC data” 
2017/13, Ferrer-Esteban, G.; Mediavilla, M.: “The more educated, the more engaged? An analysis of social capital 
and education” 
2017/14, Sanchis-Guarner, R.: “Decomposing the impact of immigration on house prices” 
2017/15, Schwab, T.; Todtenhaupt, M.: “Spillover from the haven: Cross-border externalities of patent box regimes 
within multinational firms” 
2017/16, Chacón, M.; Jensen, J.: “The institutional determinants of Southern secession” 
2017/17, Gancia, G.; Ponzetto, G.A.M.; Ventura, J.: “Globalization and political structure” 
2017/18, González-Val, R.: “City size distribution and space” 
2017/19, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Pellegrino, G.: “What firms don’t know can hurt them: Overcoming 
a lack of information on technology” 
2017/20, Costa-Campi, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.: “Why do manufacturing industries invest in energy R&D?” 






2018/1, Boadway, R.; Pestieau, P.: “The tenuous case for an annual wealth tax” 
2018/2, Garcia-López, M.À.: “All roads lead to Rome ... and to sprawl? Evidence from European cities” 
2018/3, Daniele, G.; Galletta, S.; Geys, B.: “Abandon ship? Party brands and politicians’ responses to a political 
scandal” 
2018/4, Cavalcanti, F.; Daniele, G.; Galletta, S.: “Popularity shocks and political selection” 
2018/5, Naval, J.; Silva, J. I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: “Employment effects of on-the-job human capital acquisition” 
2018/6, Agrawal, D. R.; Foremny, D.: “Relocation of the rich: migration in response to top tax rate changes from 
spanish reforms” 
2018/7, García-Quevedo, J.; Kesidou, E.; Martínez-Ros, E.: “Inter-industry differences in organisational eco-
innovation: a panel data study” 
2018/8, Aastveit, K. A.; Anundsen, A. K.: “Asymmetric effects of monetary policy in regional housing markets” 
2018/9, Curci, F.; Masera, F.: “Flight from urban blight: lead poisoning, crime and suburbanization” 
2018/10, Grossi, L.; Nan, F.: “The influence of renewables on electricity price forecasting: a robust approach” 
2018/11, Fleckinger, P.; Glachant, M.; Tamokoué Kamga, P.-H.: “Energy performance certificates and 
investments in building energy efficiency: a theoretical analysis” 
2018/12, van den Bergh, J. C.J.M.; Angelsen, A.; Baranzini, A.; Botzen, W.J. W.; Carattini, S.; Drews, S.; 
Dunlop, T.; Galbraith, E.; Gsottbauer, E.; Howarth, R. B.; Padilla, E.; Roca, J.; Schmidt, R.: “Parallel tracks 
towards a global treaty on carbon pricing” 
2018/13, Ayllón, S.; Nollenberger, N.: “The unequal opportunity for skills acquisition during the Great Recession in 
Europe” 
2018/14, Firmino, J.: “Class composition effects and school welfare: evidence from Portugal using panel data” 
2018/15, Durán-Cabré, J. M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Mas-Montserrat, M.; Salvadori, L.: “La brecha fiscal: estudio 
y aplicación a los impuestos sobre la riqueza” 
2018/16, Montolio, D.; Tur-Prats, A.: “Long-lasting social capital and its impact on economic development: the 




IEB Working Papers  
2018/17, Garcia-López, M. À.; Moreno-Monroy, A. I.: “Income segregation in monocentric and polycentric cities: 
does urban form really matter?” 
2018/18, Di Cosmo, V.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: “From forward to spot prices: producers, retailers and loss averse 
consumers in electricity markets” 
2018/19, Brachowicz Quintanilla, N.; Vall Castelló, J.: “Is changing the minimum legal drinking age an effective 
policy tool?” 
2018/20, Nerea Gómez-Fernández, Mauro Mediavilla: “Do information and communication technologies (ICT) 
improve educational outcomes? Evidence for Spain in PISA 2015” 
2018/21, Montolio, D.; Taberner, P. A.: “Gender differences under test pressure and their impact on academic 
performance: a quasi-experimental design” 
2018/22, Rice, C.; Vall Castelló, J.: “Hit where it hurts – healthcare access and intimate partner violence” 
2018/23, Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.; Simón, H.: “Wage differentials by bargaining regime in Spain (2002-2014). An 





2019/1, Mediavilla, M.; Mancebón, M. J.; Gómez-Sancho, J. M.; Pires Jiménez, L.: “Bilingual education and 
school choice: a case study of public secondary schools in the Spanish region of Madrid” 
2019/2, Brutti, Z.; Montolio, D.: “Preventing criminal minds: early education access and adult offending behavior” 
2019/3, Montalvo, J. G.; Piolatto, A.; Raya, J.: “Transaction-tax evasion in the housing market” 
2019/4, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Mas-Montserrat, M.: “Behavioural responses to the 
re)introduction of wealth taxes. Evidence from Spain” 
2019/5, Garcia-López, M.A.; Jofre-Monseny, J.; Martínez Mazza, R.; Segú, M.: “Do short-term rental platforms 
affect housing markets? Evidence from Airbnb in Barcelona” 
2019/6, Domínguez, M.; Montolio, D.: “Bolstering community ties as a means of reducing crime” 
2019/7, García-Quevedo, J.; Massa-Camps, X.: “Why firms invest (or not) in energy efficiency? A review of the 
econometric evidence” 
2019/8, Gómez-Fernández, N.; Mediavilla, M.: “What are the factors that influence the use of ICT in the classroom 
by teachers? Evidence from a census survey in Madrid” 
2019/9, Arribas-Bel, D.; Garcia-López, M.A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “The long-run redistributive power of the 
net wealth tax” 
2019/10, Arribas-Bel, D.; Garcia-López, M.A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Building(s and) cities: delineating urban 
areas with a machine learning algorithm” 






2020/1, Daniele, G.; Piolatto, A.; Sas, W.: “Does the winner take it all? Redistributive policies and political 
extremism” 
2020/2, Sanz, C.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: “Betrayed by the elites: how corruption amplifies the 
political effects of recessions” 
 
 
Cities 
